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Identical letters dated 7 September 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you the following:

At 0242 hours in the early morning of Thursday, 7 September 2017, Israeli occupation warplanes launched a treacherous attack against a Syrian armed forces military site near the city of Masyaf in Hamah governorate. The site was hit by a number of missiles, leading to the deaths of two soldiers and material damage at the location.

This new Israeli attack is part of a desperate attempt by the Israeli occupation forces that sponsor terrorism to raise the morale of their agents in terrorist organizations that are carrying out Israel's hostile agenda on Syrian soil. It comes in reaction to the major successes against terrorism achieved by the Syrian Arab Army and its allies, of which the most recent was breaking the three-year siege imposed by the terrorist Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) organization on the city of Dayr al-Zawr.

These repeated Israeli attacks have become a pattern of behaviour. They are intended to protect Nusrah Front and ISIL terrorists. It is unacceptable that the Security Council has to date not taken a single measure to put a stop to these shameless attacks, and that Israel has not been held accountable for protecting terrorists.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic demands that the Security Council should condemn the Israeli attacks and take resolute and immediate action to stop them, in implementation of its resolutions on combating terrorism and those who finance it. The Syrian Arab Republic warns that there will be serious consequences for such terrorist Israeli attacks, which are part and parcel of the crimes being perpetrated by ISIL and other terrorist organizations that are inflaming and igniting the situation in the region and the world.

Anyone who attacks the Syrian Arab Army is providing direct support for terrorism, given that the Syrian Arab Army and its allies are the ones who are combating terrorism on behalf of the entire world. The Security Council and States with influence on Israel should immediately condemn these attacks and put a stop to them in order to preserve security and stability and protect the peoples of the world from terrorism.

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I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mounzer **Mounzer**
Minister Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Distr.: General
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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Lake Chad Basin region

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2349 (2017) of 31 March 2017, in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to produce a written report within five months on the assessment by the United Nations of the situation in the Lake Chad Basin. The report provides an update on the progress made and the challenges remaining and suggests measures for consideration relating to elements of the resolution.

II. Major developments in the Lake Chad Basin region

A. Security developments and trends

2. The regional military offensive, led by the Multinational Joint Task Force and the national armies of Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria, achieved considerable gains in the fight against Boko Haram. Following the recapture of the Sambisa Forest in December 2016, a large number of Boko Haram terrorists, including a notorious commander, Abu Nazir, were reportedly neutralized in Jarawa, Borno State, Nigeria. Several weapons were captured from the group, and abducted children undergoing training were liberated. On 6 May 2017, 82 girls who had been captured by Boko Haram in Chibok village in 2014 were released. Nigerian authorities recently arrested 126 suspected Boko Haram terrorists, who had reportedly infiltrated the Damboa camp of internally displaced persons as part of a plan to attack the town. However, the Task Force continued to face financial challenges that hampered its operations, including in relation to intelligence-sharing, logistics, in particular of medical evacuations, and equipment.

3. Boko Haram continued, however, to pose a significant threat to civilian populations in Nigeria, Cameroon, the Niger and Chad. From April to June 2017, 246 attacks were recorded, resulting in the deaths of 225 civilians. Boko Haram increasingly resorted to suicide attacks, which appears to be symptomatic of their diminished combat capacity. In June, 13 suicide attacks were recorded, resulting in the deaths of 67 civilians. This was a notable increase from May, when 17 civilians were killed as a result of 10 reported suicide attacks. The group sustained its targeting of military positions, and 30 such attacks were recorded in April, 9 in May

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and 12 in June. In addition, Boko Haram resorted to looting, raids and incursions into villages in search of basic goods in anticipation of the rainy season.

4. During the celebrations of Eid al-Fitr in June, Boko Haram staged multiple attacks in Maiduguri, Nigeria, and surrounding areas, including on 7 June, when at least 13 people were killed. On 24 July, suspected Boko Haram elements carried out suicide attacks in two internally displaced persons camps near Maiduguri, reportedly killing at least eight people. On 25 July, Boko Haram ambushed an oil exploration team in the Magumeri area of Borno State, reportedly killing more than 50 people.

5. In Cameroon, the Abu Musab al-Barnawi faction of Boko Haram continued its activities in the Far North region and, as a result of such attacks, the number of civilian fatalities more than doubled in May and June, from 11 to 24. On 2 June, the group announced its intention to attack Kousséri in order to free a number of its leaders held in detention, leading local authorities to transfer the detained persons to Maroua. The control of cross-border movements of population and goods between Nigeria and Chad remained extremely challenging. Boko Haram's armed incursions and multiple suicide attacks were conducted in villages away from areas of major military operations.

6. In the Niger, Boko Haram's activities were focused in the Diffa region. On 10 April, Boko Haram carried out a major attack against a security and defence force point close to Gueskerou, resulting in the deaths of 57 Boko Haram members and injuries to 13 troops and civilians. On 28 June, two suicide bombers attacked the Kabelawa camp for internally displaced persons, killing two camp residents. On 2 July, Boko Haram elements attacked Ngalewa, killing 9 civilians and kidnapping 37 persons, including 24 women and 13 children.

7. In Chad, attacks attributed to Boko Haram and military movements in the northern basin caused the displacement of close to 2,000 people, who fled their villages around Tchoukoutalia following the attack of 5 May in Kaiga Kindjiria. Recurrent waves of suicide attacks by suspected Boko Haram elements in northern Cameroon heightened concern about the potential for the group to carry out similar attacks further north, in N'Djamena, despite the deployment of additional forces by the Government.

8. From 27 July to 1 August, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union visited the countries of the Lake Chad Basin region, to collect more information on the operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force, the impact of the crisis and the humanitarian situation.

B. Humanitarian developments

9. Some 10.7 million people across the Lake Chad Basin region currently need humanitarian assistance, including 8.5 million in Nigeria. Some 5.6 million children need life-saving assistance and 2.7 million children need psychosocial support.

10. Displacement dynamics across the region remained fluid and complex, and new displacements occurred alongside the return of internally displaced persons and refugees. The overall number of people displaced as a result of attacks by Boko Haram and military operations in the Lake Chad Basin has remained relatively stable over the past year and is estimated to be 2.4 million.

11. In north-eastern Nigeria, it is estimated that, since August 2015, more than 1 million internally displaced persons have returned to their local government areas. Many of them have not been able to return to their villages of origin, however, owing to insecurity, and remain instead in the capitals of their local government

areas, where they continue to require humanitarian assistance. Overall, 1.7 million people remain internally displaced in the three most affected north-eastern States (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe), and there has been a slight decrease of 78,000 internally displaced persons since January 2017.

12. While refugee returns from Cameroon to Nigeria increased from April to June, when some 13,000 refugees returned from Minawao camp in Cameroon primarily to Banki and Pulka in Nigeria, the number of internally displaced persons increased from 200,000 in March to 228,000 as at June. Between January and May, several thousand refugees reportedly returned from the Diffa region in the Niger to Damasak, Nigeria, although a large proportion of those "returns" were part of a pattern of frequent back-and-forth movements across the border. In Chad, overall displacement figures remained stable, but Boko Haram took advantage of the security vacuum left by troop redeployments and the logistical impediments of the rainy season to attack communities. More than 700 people were newly displaced in the Kaiga Kindjiria border area in May, following Boko Haram attacks.

13. Despite the signing, on 2 March, of a tripartite agreement between Cameroon, Nigeria and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to manage the voluntary return of refugees from Cameroon to Nigeria, approximately 4,300 forced returns have been registered so far in 2017. Although the number has significantly decreased in 2017, concerns remained, given that refugees were returning to dangerous locations where conditions do not yet exist to make returns safe and sustainable. Meanwhile, the tripartite commission that oversees the implementation of the tripartite agreement held its first meeting on 10 August.

14. What began as a protection crisis has developed into a large-scale food security and nutrition emergency that includes a credible risk of famine. Hundreds of thousands of farmers across the Lake Chad Basin have missed four consecutive planting seasons, and trade routes and markets have been closed. Across the region, some 7.2 million people are severely food insecure, and in north-eastern Nigeria the number increased from 4.7 million in May to 5.2 million in June. In Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, Nigeria, an estimated 50,000 people are experiencing life-threatening, famine-like conditions. The large majority of internally displaced persons in Cameroon, Chad and the Niger live in areas affected by serious food insecurity. One in three people, or almost 1.5 million people, in the Far North region of Cameroon are food insecure at crisis and emergency levels.

15. Across the Lake Chad Basin, some 515,000 children are expected to suffer from severe acute malnutrition in 2017, most of them (approximately 450,000) in north-eastern Nigeria. Meanwhile, there is a high risk of disease outbreaks, given the limited health infrastructure. In north-eastern Nigeria, an estimated 201 health centres (about 40 per cent of health facilities) were destroyed by conflict. In the Diffa region of the Niger, an outbreak of hepatitis E affected more than 1,100 people and killed at least 36 in 2017, and more than half the population does not have access to health-care services or potable water.

16. Despite operational gains by humanitarian agencies in providing assistance in hard-to-reach locations, access continued to be challenging in some areas, particularly in Nigeria. In north-eastern Nigeria, along the border with Cameroon and Chad in particular, many people remained beyond the reach of aid workers owing to continued Boko Haram attacks and military operations. Humanitarian agencies have made progress in tackling access challenges through cross-border operations, logistical enhancements, the establishment of joint infrastructure and strengthened civil-military coordination. A cross-border operation has been put in place from Cameroon to Nigeria, involving biweekly convoys to deliver assistance

to people in Banki, Gambaru and Ngala. In the Niger, recent military operations resulted in access restrictions to areas such as Yebi and Dewa. In Nigeria, some progress is being made in establishing humanitarian hubs, which, it is expected, will limit the need for road travel and enable a more permanent humanitarian presence in remote areas. Three helicopters operated by the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service in north-eastern Nigeria carried more than 2,200 passengers in the first five months of 2017, and multiple fixed-wing aircraft across the region served as vital enablers of humanitarian operations.

17. The Governments of the affected countries have made significant efforts to respond to the needs of the people and partner with the humanitarian community. For example, the Government of the Niger contributed $4.4 million to the country's humanitarian appeal for 2017 and remained one of the few Governments in the world to support its own country's appeal in such a manner. The Governments of Cameroon and Chad have shown great generosity by hosting refugee populations that are among the largest in Africa. The Government of Nigeria responded to shortfalls in funding for international humanitarian agencies by pledging $1 billion at the Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region, held in February, and launching a new food assistance initiative with the aim of delivering 30,000 tons of cereals to affected populations in the north-east, in coordination with humanitarian agencies.

18. Despite the generous contributions of national authorities and donors, humanitarian funding for the Lake Chad Basin remained inadequate. The combined regional humanitarian appeal for 2017, which requests $1.5 billion, was 30.9 per cent funded as at the end of June, when $465 million had been received. As at the end of June, 84 per cent of the $458 million in pledges made at the Oslo Humanitarian Conference had been committed or contributed.

C. Human rights situation

19. The activities of Boko Haram and the responses by the security forces of the affected countries had an impact on the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms by the people living in affected areas.

20. Boko Haram increasingly resorted to suicide attacks, often carried out by young women and girls who had been forcibly recruited. It has attacked public places, schools markets, internally displaced persons and refugee camps, and private homes, and has looted property, especially cattle. Insecurity remained a serious challenge, especially in recently recaptured areas, while the attendant restriction on freedom of movement is one of the reasons for food insecurity, as people in affected areas are often unable to farm.

21. United Nations entities received numerous allegations of serious human rights violations committed in the context of counter-terrorism operations led by the Multinational Joint Task Force or national security forces. These include extrajudicial killings, lack of protection of civilians, torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary and unlawful arrests and detention, prolonged pretrial detention, enforced disappearances and extortion. The lack of due process further raised broad human rights concerns.

22. Community-based local vigilante groups in Cameroon and Nigeria were reportedly responsible for human rights abuses, including killings and the recruitment and use of children in combat operations and in support functions. Concerns were raised about the rule of law and the possibility that affected communities were taking justice into their own hands.

23. On 9 May, Chad, Mali and the Niger signed a tripartite convention to strengthen judicial cooperation, enabling the three countries to arrest, prosecute and convict each other's nationals. On 4 August, the Vice-President of Nigeria, Yemi Osinbajo, announced the establishment of a seven-member judicial commission to review the compliance of the Nigerian armed forces with their human rights obligations and the rules of engagement in local conflict and insurgency situations.

Child protection

24. United Nations entities documented the recruitment and use by Boko Haram of 673 children, including 182 girls, in the first half of 2017. Most of the children were recruited before 2017. From January to June, United Nations entities verified the killing and maiming of 528 children, including the killing of 67 children (47 girls, 19 boys and 1 whose sex is unknown) who were used by Boko Haram to carry out suicide attacks. A total of 76 children, including 44 girls, were used in suicide attacks in north-eastern Nigeria (66) and the Far North region of Cameroon (10). In addition, 104 child casualties were verified in the Far North region of Cameroon during the same period. While the actual figures are likely to be significantly higher, United Nations entities documented 20 incidents of rape and other forms of sexual violence by Boko Haram, affecting 65 girls aged from 7 to 18, and the abduction of 86 children, including 40 girls, in Nigeria. A more detailed account of the impact of armed conflict on children in Nigeria until December 2016 is given in the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Nigeria (S/2017/304).

25. Concerns arose about the detention of children during counter-terrorism responses of the security forces of the affected countries. Children were detained in poor conditions on account of their or their parents' alleged association with Boko Haram, in contravention of international child protection standards. In Cameroon, six boys aged from 15 to 17 were detained at the Garoua and Maroua central prisons. In the Niger, 21 boys, including 4 Nigerians, were detained at the Niamey juvenile detention centre, while 20 others were awaiting age determination in another detention facility. Another 33, including 4 girls, who surrendered, were kept at a reinsertion programme in the Diffa region. In Nigeria, at least 493 children, including 198 girls, were held in Giwa military barracks. A total of 23 children were verified as having been recruited and used by the Civilian Joint Task Force in support and camp security functions in Borno State, Nigeria, in the first half of 2017.

26. The Nigerian army continued to use schools and hospitals for military purposes, including when classes were ongoing, resulting in the relocation of 3,283 children in Yobe State. The Nigerian military manages at least 14 internally displaced persons camps, mostly in northern Borno State. The militarization of the camps has increased the risks of sexual exploitation and abuse, and there have been several reports of sexual abuse by soldiers and other personnel. In the Diffa region of the Niger, Boko Haram attacked and looted five local health centres and allegedly looted two primary schools. In June, the group attacked a health centre in the Far North region of Cameroon and killed a nurse.

Gender

27. Boko Haram abducted thousands of women and girls and subjected them to sexual violence, including sexual slavery, forced marriage and forced pregnancy. It also continued to subject women and girls to physical and psychological abuse, forced labour and forced participation in military operations, and to deprive abductees of food and water, causing some women and girls to starve themselves to feed their babies.

28. In Chad, the number of reported cases of gender-based violence increased from 67 in March to 176 in April, and internally displaced persons constituted 91 per cent of victims. In Cameroon, the crisis reportedly led to an increase in cases of early marriage of minor girls among impoverished populations, particularly refugees. Displaced women and girls continued to face a high risk of sexual and gender-based violence and to have limited access to basic services, forcing them to exchange sex for food and other essential supplies. In the past year, United Nations entities documented 43 cases of sexual violence allegedly perpetrated by security guards, army officers, camp officials, members of the Civilian Joint Task Force and vigilante groups in Nigeria. The actual numbers of victims may be significantly higher. Cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by national and international military forces were regularly reported, and the majority of allegations originated from the areas immediately surrounding Multinational Joint Task Force bases. However, very few official complaints were filed owing to a lack of information and confidence in the judicial system, among other things. The United Nations continue to advocate for the Multinational Joint Task Force to put forward a strategy to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse, including by recruiting a dedicated gender adviser within its civilian component.

D. Socioeconomic situation

29. The conflict in the Lake Chad Basin continued to exacerbate the already limited access to basic services, farmlands, markets and other sources of livelihoods, leading to insecurity of lives and property, high unemployment rates and low economic participation. For many, the conflict has resulted in the loss of housing, livelihoods and productive assets, including farmlands and business networks, as well as education for vulnerable young people. Meanwhile, the heavy financial investment in the regional military fight against Boko Haram by countries in the Lake Chad Basin region has resulted in the diversion of much of their national budgets away from providing basic social services and towards addressing insecurity.

30. The crisis affected access to education in Nigeria, where an estimated 2,000 school facilities have been destroyed, 1,500 schools have been closed for more than two years and 952,029 school-aged children have no access to education. The crisis also resulted in massive destruction of basic infrastructure, health and educational facilities, commercial buildings, private houses and agricultural assets. In north-eastern Nigeria alone, the total damage is estimated at $8.93 billion, and 79 per cent of the losses are attributed to the agriculture and private housing sectors.

31. In the Far North region of Cameroon, which suffers from the highest rate of poverty in the country, chronic food deficit and acute malnutrition, as well as the lowest level of education, cereal production decreased by about 25 per cent in 2017 compared with the 2016 harvest season. Boko Haram-related violence led to the closure of schools and shops and disrupted markets and the livestock trade. The partial reopening of the border with Nigeria restored some small-scale trade with limited cross-border flows in certain areas. The rainy season and bad road conditions were expected to further reduce cross-border exchanges. Access to arable land for the displaced population remained an issue, and most of the displaced families had no option other than to return to their villages. The crisis also reduced the possibilities for transhumance routes and pasture zones for cattle, leading many livestock breeders to sell their cattle.

32. In the Niger, the security conditions continued to impede growth in the non-oil economy. The crisis and the restrictions imposed by the Government since February 2015 negatively affected the agricultural sector in the Diffa region, leading to a

significant drop in production from fisheries and irrigated cultivated areas around Lake Chad and along the Komadougou River. This also resulted in fewer opportunities for income-generating activities for young people.

33. In Chad, the budget crisis continued to limit government resources for addressing socioeconomic issues, leading to social unrest. The Government appealed for more international assistance as compensation for the costly military readiness and regional interventions being shouldered by the country. At a meeting with development partners on 24 May, the President, Idriss Deby Itno, stated that Chad had spent more than CFAF 250 billion (approximately $437.2 million) on defence and security and more than CFAF 40 billion on humanitarian aid.

III. United Nations response

A. Enhancing United Nations coherence and coordination in the subregion

United Nations strategy in response to the Lake Chad Basin crisis

34. In response to the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin region, the United Nations has put in place the Inter-Agency Task Force on Boko Haram, co-chaired by the Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This system-wide strategic coordination mechanism includes 18 United Nations entities at Headquarters and at the regional and country levels, as appropriate, as well as the United Nations Resident Coordinators of the four affected countries, on behalf of the United Nations country teams. The Task Force adopted a seven-pillar strategy, which was updated in April.

35. The Task Force also carried out capacity-mapping of the financial and human resources gaps at the level of the United Nations country teams. The results of the exercise are currently being validated and will be used to develop a regional strategy for integrated fundraising.

Operational coordination

36. The country-specific coordination of United Nations activities in response to the Lake Chad Basis crisis is undertaken by the Resident Coordinators and the United Nations country teams, in close consultation with national authorities, guided by their respective United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks.

37. The operational humanitarian response to the Boko Haram crisis is undertaken by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, in partnership with non-governmental organizations, and coordinated through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Post-War and Disaster Reconstruction and Rehabilitation. Working in support of the Government of each affected country, the humanitarian country team serves as a key body for policy- and decision-making, with specialized sector or cluster working groups, as well as an inter-sector or cluster working group, ensuring coordination at the technical level. Coordination and information-sharing also takes place at the regional level, among the respective Humanitarian Coordinators, resulting in the production of the "2017 humanitarian needs and requirements overview" for the Lake Chad Basin.

Coordination with partners

38. The co-hosts of the Oslo Humanitarian Conference, namely, Germany, Nigeria, Norway and the United Nations, together with Cameroon, Chad and the Niger, agreed to form a consultative group on prevention and stabilization to address some

of the root causes of the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin region beyond immediate humanitarian assistance. The first meeting of the group is scheduled for 6 September.

39. A regional stabilization conference organized by the Lake Chad Basin Commission, with the support of the African Union, is planned for 3 to 5 October in N'Djamena. It will be the first of three such conferences and is expected to support the development of a regional stabilization strategy for the areas affected by Boko Haram.

B. United Nations support to national and subregional efforts

Political engagement

40. Senior United Nations officials continued to advocate increased support to the countries of the Lake Chad Basin at all meetings with regional and international leaders.

41. On 31 May, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa François Louncény Fall, met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cameroon in Yaoundé. The Minister underlined the need to provide development assistance to the Far North region. The Special Representative noted that the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) would assist with developing projects, with a strong emphasis on supporting women and young people, in coordination with the Peacebuilding Fund. Earlier in May, two teams from UNOCA travelled to Chad and Cameroon to assess the impact of Boko Haram on the population, especially women and children. UNOCA is also planning a joint visit with the Economic Community of Central African States to Boko Haram-affected countries.

42. As previously reported, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel visited Nigeria from 26 to 28 April (S/2017/563). He also visited the Niger from 28 to 30 May. During his meetings with the authorities, the issues of deradicalizing and reintegrating former Boko Haram fighters and addressing the root causes of the crisis were discussed. While participating in the second regional conversation on investing in peace and the prevention of violence, including violent extremism, in the Sahel-Sahara, held in N'Djamena on 31 May and 1 June, the Special Representative met with the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. They discussed the implementation of the Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan, including progress with regard to the envisaged water transfer from the Congo Basin to Lake Chad.

43. On 18 April and 19 July, a representative of the United Nations Office to the African Union delivered statements on behalf of the United Nations at the meetings of the African Union Peace and Security Council on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force, and underlined concerns regarding the humanitarian and human rights aspects of the crisis. The representative also reiterated the technical support the United Nations provides to the Task Force through the African Union Commission, and called for enhanced cooperation between the African Union and the Lake Chad Basin countries. The United Nations Office to the African Union called for continuing donor support to the Task Force and for the region to address the humanitarian situation.

44. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict continued to call on officials of the Government of Nigeria to release the children held in detention for their alleged association with Boko Haram and to support the finalization of an action plan to end child recruitment and use by the

Civilian Joint Task Force. Her office provided support to the discussions led by the United Nations Children's Fund on the adoption of a protocol for the handover of children associated with Boko Haram to child protection actors in Cameroon.

45. On 18 and 19 July, the United Nations Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees for Protection travelled to Cameroon, where he raised concerns about the forced return or removal of refugees from Cameroon and the non-admission and rejection of new asylum seekers at the border. The Cameroonian authorities gave assurances that international law would be respected, including the principles of voluntariness, safety and dignity in the context of return, and that Cameroon would continue to provide safety to people in need.

46. From 19 to 27 July, the Deputy Secretary-General and the Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on Women, Peace and Security, accompanied by the Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict led a mission to Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo which focused on women, peace and security and development. In Nigeria, the mission highlighted the impact of the crisis on women in the north-east of the country. On 8 August, the Deputy Secretary-General discussed the fight against Boko Haram with the Director of the Cabinet of the Prime Minister of Cameroon in New York. On 10 August, she briefed the Security Council on the outcome of the mission.

Humanitarian response

47. Despite limitations in funding, access and security, humanitarian actors made progress in expanding the humanitarian response in what remains a challenging operating environment. As part of their scale-up, humanitarian agencies activated internal emergency arrangements and continued to deploy more staff, reaching 650 international and 1,500 national staff as of July in north-eastern Nigeria, up from fewer than 100 international staff one year previously.

48. In north-eastern Nigeria, some 2.3 million people have been reached with food assistance and almost 2 million people with health care to date in 2017. More than 700,000 people were provided with safe water; 57,000 children with severe acute malnutrition were admitted for treatment; and more than 4 million children were vaccinated for measles.

49. In the Diffa region of the Niger, 316,500 people received food support in April and May and 282,000 people received water, sanitation and hygiene assistance in May. Since the beginning of 2017, 6,370 children with severe acute malnutrition have been admitted for treatment, 157,000 people have received shelter and 98,000 people have received non-food items. Some 261 schools were relocated to safer areas, making it possible to provide emergency education support to 45,000 school-aged children by June and psychological support to 18,500 children by May.

50. In Chad, some 116,000 displaced persons and vulnerable host communities have received food assistance each month so far in 2017. Between January and May, some 8,300 children suffering from severe acute malnutrition received treatment from partners in the Lac region and more than 71,000 conflict-affected people were provided with potable water and basic sanitation facilities.

51. In Cameroon, food assistance was provided to 200,000 people in the most affected areas of the Far North region. In addition, fortified and nutritious foods were provided to more than 100,000 young children on a monthly basis to treat and prevent malnutrition. Over 57,000 people were provided with access to fresh water and 5,600 with sanitation support.

52. Across the region, civil-military coordination with the Multinational Joint Task Force and national armies was strengthened. A bimonthly civil-military coordination forum was established in N'Djamena to facilitate interaction between humanitarian actors and the Task Force at the strategic level. Participants in the forum have tackled questions around security, humanitarian access and the protection of civilians. In north-eastern Nigeria, civil-military coordination was taking place between the Nigerian military and the Task Force through information-sharing on planned humanitarian missions, capacity development in the area of international humanitarian law and protection, and the organization of armed escorts as a last resort. A civil-military coordination action plan for 2017 and 2018 was developed and presented for endorsement by the operational humanitarian country team, while guidelines on the use of armed escorts and on civil-military interaction were being developed. Liaison continued with the Nigerian armed forces regarding the establishment of humanitarian hubs outside Maiduguri to ensure adequate security for humanitarian workers. There was a particular need for greater investment in the training of military personnel in areas such as international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles. Civil-military coordination was also ensured with the national armies in Chad, Cameroon and the Niger.

53. The Department of Safety and Security established a security information and operation centre in Maiduguri to track reported incidents and field movement by humanitarian workers. A security analyst was also recruited to deploy to Maiduguri to implement a regional security information fusion strategy. The Department introduced the "Safe and secure approaches to field environments" programme, with the support of United Nations agencies.

54. Gender considerations and programming were mainstreamed in the response across the four countries, as reflected in the collection of gender-disaggregated data, gender-sensitive programming and consultation. In Nigeria, partners developed referral pathways and standard operating procedures for the response to gender-based violence. Of the referrals and incidents reported for gender-based violence case management, an estimated 80 per cent were reportedly possible thanks to the implementation of those mechanisms.

55. Following the issuance in February of the Secretary-General's call for action to prevent famine, important steps are being taken to implement the new way of working in Nigeria. The United Nations country team in Nigeria is working on a strategy for returns and durable solutions, involving both humanitarian and development partners. The objective is to support solutions for the voluntary return, local integration or resettlement of displaced persons, while contributing to the resilience of conflict-affected communities in north-eastern Nigeria.

56. Since 2014, the Central Emergency Response Fund has provided nearly $147 million for humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected people and those affected by the deepening food crisis, including $46 million in 2017. Of that amount, $22 million was allocated to Nigeria in February to provide assistance in newly accessible areas and to address the risk of famine.

57. Owing to a lack of funding, humanitarian agencies were unable to sustain and further expand their scale-up. In June, the World Food Programme was forced to cut emergency food aid for 400,000 people, going from 1.8 million to 1.4 million beneficiaries, in north-eastern Nigeria, at the same time as the lean season was driving up food prices, depleting the meagre resources of millions of affected people and intensifying hunger. Other agencies and sectors are similarly underfunded across the region.

Protection of civilians, protection and promotion of human rights and children and armed conflict

58. United Nations human rights support to national and subregional efforts focused primarily on capacity-building and advocacy. In Cameroon, the Subregional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa worked to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement officers and security forces in the Far North region to protect human rights, particularly during arrests, detention and operations. Discussions with protection actors enabled the security forces to gain a better understanding of the protection needs of refugees and internally displaced persons. The Centre trained local human rights organizations in the monitoring and reporting of human rights violations in the context of terrorism, enabling the organizations to effectively carry out monitoring and protection activities. In the Niger, the United Nations protection cluster established a task force to monitor respect for due process during trials of persons arrested on terrorism charges. In Chad, the opening of a country office of OHCHR to enhance regional monitoring and reporting on human rights was delayed for lack of funding.

59. Enhancing the capacity of security personnel, including through training on respect for international human rights law and international humanitarian law, has been central to United Nations support to the Nigerian army. Training was also provided to civil society organizations on how to engage with United Nations human rights mechanisms in order to strengthen the monitoring and reporting capacity of the former. United Nations entities also helped civil society groups to provide legal and psychosocial support to victims of torture and gender-based violence through funding from the humanitarian response plan for Nigeria.

Countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration, and accountability

60. The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre is finalizing the development of a regional framework for integrated assistance for countering terrorism for the joint force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel), as requested by the Security Council (resolution 2195 (2014) and S/PRST/2015/24). The framework currently includes nine regional projects submitted by various United Nations entities covering a period of three years.

61. The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre continued to explore potential cooperation between United Nations entities, the G-5 Sahel permanent secretariat and the G-5 Sahel member States to address regional needs in countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism. In May, a mission was deployed to Dakar and Nouakchott to validate the projects under the regional framework for integrated assistance for countering terrorism, and a senior consultant travelled to both capitals in June to discuss with the permanent secretariat and implementing partners the organization of a regional border security management workshop for G-5 Sahel experts.

62. In May, 35 Nigerian aviation security master trainers graduated as part of a project implemented by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, in partnership with the Government of Nigeria, to deliver and sustain a high standard of security screening across the civil aviation infrastructure of Nigeria. The project was co-funded by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Under the advance passenger information project, the Centre and partners conducted a capacity-building consultation in Nigeria from 11 to 15 June, to develop a national advance passenger information road map for the Government.

63. Pursuant to the statement by the President of the Security Council dated 29 May 2015 (S/PRST/2015/11), the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Office developed a capacity-building implementation plan to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. Thirteen Task Force entities contributed 50 mutually reinforcing project proposals to address the foreign terrorist fighter issue. Among them are projects, which remain unfunded, to support Member States in the Lake Chad Basin region in their efforts to enhance rule-of-law-based criminal justice responses to terrorists, border security management and the prevention of the acquisition of arms.

64. In line with Security Council resolution 2178 (2014), the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have developed a regional initiative for the affected countries with the aim of, inter alia, supporting the development of national prosecution strategies to triage persons associated with Boko Haram, to develop strategies for the rehabilitation and reintegration of persons associated with Boko Haram and to raise awareness of the unique challenges in dealing with children formerly associated with Boko Haram.

65. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and UNODC co-facilitated a national workshop on prosecution strategies for terrorism-related cases and the need for effective inter-agency collaboration in Abuja from 20 to 22 June. The development of a dedicated prosecution strategy with the aim of prioritizing the treatment of terrorism cases related to persons captured from Boko Haram or persons who have surrendered to Nigerian authorities represents an essential step towards the development of a comprehensive prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategy.

66. In May and June, UNODC trained 50 criminal justice and law enforcement officials of Cameroon and Chad, including from Boko Haram-affected areas, on judicial and police cooperation in terrorism cases, especially in mutual legal assistance and extradition. Between January and May, UNODC provided legislative advisory services to help Cameroon to align its counter-terrorism legislation with relevant international legal instruments. A draft amended law is being considered by the Government.

67. In May and June, UNODC also trained 60 criminal justice and law enforcement officers from the Niger, focusing on crime scene management, evidence collection, special investigative techniques, home search, vehicle checks and the analysis and use of intelligence information in terrorism cases. In addition, UNODC funded missions to the Diffa region of the Niger for prosecutors, investigative judges and specialized counter-terrorism investigators to advance investigations related to terrorism charges.

Early recovery and development

68. In Nigeria, returnees were surveyed to obtain their views on the planned closure of official internally displaced person camps in Adamawa and Borno States. The surveys found that the majority of internally displaced persons in official camps will agree to return to their place of habitual residence only if security, housing, livelihood opportunities and humanitarian assistance are improved. A large number of respondents indicated that, if such factors were not met, they did not wish to return and that, in that case, other durable solutions had to be considered. Findings from the survey, together with the prevailing insecurity, persuaded the Government to delay camp closures in the two States and to explore alternative solutions.

69. Early recovery clusters or sector working groups, as applicable, were active as part of humanitarian coordination activities in the affected countries. UNDP

provided overall coordination and support. The objective was to bridge humanitarian and development initiatives, build community resilience, prevent further conflicts, prepare for the return of internally displaced persons and refugees and address triggers — as well as, in some instances, underlying root causes — of the crisis.

70. In Nigeria, from January to May, members of the early recovery sector supported the provision of livelihood assistance, including cash-for-work, job creation and the revival of small businesses. They also restored access to basic social services for 617,000 persons, including 82,267 internally displaced persons, 54,844 returnees and 479,889 host community members. A total of 118,437 beneficiaries were directly supported by projects run by United Nations agencies.

71. In Borno State, Nigeria, UNDP, in partnership with the World Health Organization and others, is piloting an innovative community stabilization approach to quickly deliver an integrated package of early recovery support community by community. The programme benefits returning internally displaced persons and host communities. It also provides incentives for internally displaced persons to return and for young people to find viable occupations. The approach is currently being rolled out and will be expanded to cover additional locations, with funding from the European Commission. Plans are being pursued to adapt this approach as a regional strategy covering relevant regions in the four affected countries.

72. In Cameroon, early recovery projects contributed to the efforts of the Government to prevent and counter violent extremism by providing livelihood restoration, community infrastructure rehabilitation, support to local governance bodies and social cohesion and dialogue initiatives. Through the United Nations trust fund for human security, UNDP assists the Government in designing interventions to prevent violent extremism, including through surveys, capacity-development with Qur'anic school teachers and students, and peace messaging for greater social cohesion. A cross-border project with Chad on peacebuilding and the prevention of violent extremism is currently being developed.

73. In the Diffa region of the Niger, UNDP, together with national partners and other United Nations entities, supported initiatives contributing to the reintegration of former Boko Haram combatants and community resilience through (a) supporting diversified livelihood activities, especially for women-headed households and young people; (b) increasing the access of vulnerable communities, particularly women and girls, to basic socioeconomic services; and (c) strengthening regional and community peace and security early warning mechanisms, as well as supporting inter- and intracommunity social cohesion and dialogue for peaceful coexistence, with a particular focus on women and young people.

74. In Chad, the UNDP programme on early recovery response covered deradicalization and the prevention of violent extremism, start-up grants and business support for 975 young people in the Lac region, and the setting up of a legal and institutional framework on border management and capacity-building for security personnel with a view to facilitating informal cross-border trade in the Lac region.

United Nations support to the Multinational Joint Task Force

75. The United Nations Office to the African Union continued to provide technical support and strategic advice to the African Union Commission and the Lake Chad Basin Commission on the management of the Multinational Joint Task Force. The African Union Commission deployed two Human Rights Officers as part of the civilian component of the Task Force headquarters in N'Djamena. Recruitment to other posts, such as Civilian Coordinator, Civilian Affairs Officer, Child Protection

and Protection of Civilians component staff, Logistics Officer and Interpreter, was being finalized at the time of writing.

76. During the Multinational Joint Task Force donors' conference held in February 2016 in Addis Ababa, the European Union pledged €50 million (approximately $58.19 million) through the African Union Peace Facility. The United Kingdom had pledged £5 million (approximately $6.52 million) through the Peace Facility before the conference. In utilizing the United Kingdom fund, 34 vehicles, 30 rough-terrain motorcycles, 15 electrical generators and assorted communications equipment were procured, delivered to the Task Force and put to use. The balance of the fund was committed and the procurement process for more items and services is ongoing. With regard to the European Union fund, a procurement process is under way for services and goods.

77. Early in 2017, Turkey pledged to support the operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force through the African Union Commission by donating priority equipment, including explosive ordnance devices, night vision goggles and amphibious assets and equipment. China pledged to donate field and information and communications technology equipment and furniture to the Task Force. The African Union Commission is following up on the pledges.

78. United Nations entities are working towards the creation of a human rights due diligence policy framework that would promote the establishment of measures and mechanisms, in line with Security Council resolution 2349 (2017), to prevent and address violations of international human rights and humanitarian law that could be committed in the context of the military operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force.

Gender and women's rights

79. United Nations agencies provided critical support to the 82 Chibok girls released by Boko Haram. This included safeguarding their health care, ensuring psychosocial support and beginning the process of rehabilitation.

80. From 19 to 21 July, UNODC and OHCHR organized a subregional workshop in Yaoundé on the gender dimensions of the criminal justice response to terrorism for the Lake Chad Basin countries. Its purpose was to support the countries in enhancing the integration of a gender perspective into their criminal justice responses to terrorism. From 9 to 11 May, OHCHR in Nigeria organized a national-level workshop on the same topic.

IV. Observations and recommendations

81. I am encouraged by the progress made thus far in the fight against Boko Haram and commend the Governments of the affected countries for their efforts in this regard, including through their participation in the Multinational Joint Task Force. However, the lack of a regional plan to address the root causes of the crisis is impeding progress towards finding a sustainable solution. In this connection, I welcome the plans of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Union to hold a first regional conference on stabilization in N'Djamena, in October, which should eventually lead to the development of a regional strategy that addresses the root causes of the emergence and sustenance of Boko Haram. I reiterate the commitment of the United Nations to working with regional countries on bringing about an end to the ongoing violence, promoting human development and alleviating the suffering of civilians.

82. I welcome the significant scale-up of the humanitarian response over the past year. I also note that humanitarian needs have increased during the same period, requiring additional funding. The Lake Chad Basin will continue to require sustained investment in humanitarian action for some time, alongside investment in development. I urge all partners to redouble their efforts to provide life-saving assistance to the affected populations, as this also forms the basis for early and longer-term recovery. I welcome the steps taken by the Governments in the region to respond to the humanitarian needs in coordination with the humanitarian community, and urge them to sustain this effort, including by facilitating access to people in need and by fast-tracking bureaucratic and administrative procedures for the United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations providing assistance.

83. I call on the affected Governments in the region, and their partners, to ensure the full implementation of the Abuja Action Statement of 2016, which aims to enhance protection and respond to the most urgent needs of refugees, internally displaced persons and other affected populations. Given the continuing insecurity and lack of basic services in many areas affected by Boko Haram, involuntary and unsafe returns of refugees and internally displaced persons must be avoided. I urge the Governments of the region to ensure that returns are voluntary, safe, well informed and dignified. United Nations entities stand ready to support them in this regard. I call for the full implementation of the tripartite agreement between Cameroon, Nigeria and UNHCR and welcome the convening of the first meeting of the tripartite commission on 10 August.

84. While resilience-building must be integrated into the emergency responses, further action from development actors is required. Government-led development efforts are critical to tackle the root causes of the crisis. National and local efforts must continue to be augmented by international support, and I welcome the generous pledges and contributions already made to that end by donors. However, a significant increase in humanitarian and development funding, preferably for joint action along this nexus, is urgently required, along with the rapid disbursement of pledges.

85. I strongly condemn the continuing abuses of human rights by Boko Haram, including the killings, forceful use of children as suicide bombers, and sexual and gender-based violence against women and children, among other forms of violence against civilians. I urge the respective authorities to hold accountable and bring to justice those responsible for these heinous acts.

86. I remain concerned about allegations of human rights violations committed in the name of countering terrorism. All counter-terrorism activities must comply with international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. I urge the Governments of the affected countries to take measures to prevent arbitrary arrest and detention in contravention of international obligations. Further, I urge them to swiftly investigate all allegations of human rights violations. The use of military or special courts to try civilians must be exceptional and limited to serious cases in which civilian courts are unable to undertake trials. It is essential that the Governments strive to increase access to justice, ensure accountability for all abuses and violations of human rights, and maintain their commitment to combating impunity. This should include strengthening internal mechanisms for the security forces, publishing the outcome of internal investigations and providing adequate and effective redress for victims. I also call on the Governments to take immediate steps to strengthen and expand measures to protect civilians, including in the context of counter-insurgency operations, and cease the use of vigilante groups.

87. The United Nations is committed to supporting the strengthening of international human rights monitoring mechanisms in collaboration with national human rights institutions, including by enhancing the capacity of the countries of the region. However, the lack of funding has limited the ability of the United Nations to undertake these tasks. I therefore encourage the international community to generously contribute funds to enable the United Nations to support national and subregional efforts to establish national and regional mechanisms for systematic monitoring and reporting of the human rights situation in the Lake Chad Basin.

88. I call on the Government of Nigeria to join the Lake Chad Basin countries and other Member States in endorsing the Paris Commitments to protect children from unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups. I urge the Civilian Joint Task Force in Nigeria to adopt and implement an action plan to end the recruitment and use of children. I call on the Government of the Niger to define a national programme for the care and protection of children associated with armed groups. I call on the Government of Cameroon to adopt a handover protocol or instrument stipulating the release of children detained in the context of counter-insurgency military operations against Boko Haram in Cameroon and their referral to civilian actors for reintegration support.

89. The need to develop a strategy to engage women in the prevention of violent extremism is made more urgent by the complexity of the categories into which women involved with Boko Haram fall. A regional strategy should be developed to engage women's civil society organizations and facilitate their interaction with regional bodies such as the Multinational Joint Task Force and the Lake Chad Basin Commission, for example through the establishment of a women's situation room for the whole region and the deployment of gender advisory expertise to the Task Force.

90. In line with Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 2178 (2014), the United Nations will continue to support national efforts to bring to justice any person who participates in the financing, planning or preparation of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts. The support will include the development and implementation of a regional and coordinated strategy, pursuant to Council resolution 2349 (2017). This would encompass assistance to develop approaches to address the full range of persons who have been associated with or otherwise affected by Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, including victims as well as potential perpetrators, and to develop and implement gender-sensitive and human rights-compliant programmes for their rehabilitation. This also encompasses support for programmes for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, where appropriate, as well as improving the capacity of authorities, including law enforcement, to prevent and investigate terrorist acts, while also respecting human rights.

91. The United Nations will continue to support the strengthening and promotion of cooperation between investigators and prosecutors, and between them and the military, where appropriate, to improve domestic investigative capacities and border control measures, to enable successful prosecutions. The purpose is also to promote international cooperation among intelligence agencies, law enforcement officials, prosecutors and other relevant actors, and to strengthen measures to counter the sources of financing of terrorism, including those of Boko Haram.

92. I encourage the African Union Commission to expedite the recruitment of civilian personnel for the remaining vacant posts in the Multinational Joint Task Force and to disburse the funds provided by key partners. I also call on donors to fulfil the pledges made at the African Union donors' conference held in February

2016, and further encourage Member States to contribute generously to the African Union Trust Fund. I encourage international support to the Task Force and to Member States in the Lake Chad Basin region.

93. I would like to thank all staff of the United Nations system working in or on the Lake Chad Basin region for their efforts to advance the cause of peace and security in that area.

United Nations S/2017/765

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 August 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 7 September 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit a report of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the status of implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya (see annex). The report, dated 23 August 2017, covers the period from 23 July to 22 August 2017.

The report was prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council Decision EC-M-52/DEC.1 of 20 July 2016 and Security Council resolution 2298 (2016) of 22 July 2016, for transmission to the Security Council.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

17-15728 (E) 110917

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Annex

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Status of implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya", prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of Executive Council Decision EC-M-52/DEC.1 of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, dated 20 July 2016, and United Nations Security Council resolution 2298 (2016), dated 22 July 2016, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 23 July 2017 to 22 August 2017 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-52/DEC.2, dated 27 July 2016, and EC-M-53/DEC.1, dated 26 August 2016.

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Report of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Status of the implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya

1. At its Fifty-Second Meeting, the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") adopted a decision on the "Destruction of Libya's Remaining Chemical Weapons" (EC-M-52/DEC.1, dated 20 July 2016) and requested the Director-General to assist Libya in developing a modified plan of destruction of Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons. On 22 July 2016, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2298 (2016), welcoming and endorsing the decision by the Council and requesting the Director-General, through the Secretary-General, to report to the Security Council on a regular basis until the destruction is complete and verified.

2. At the conclusion of its Fifty-Second Meeting, the Council adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Libya's Remaining Category 2 Chemical Weapons" (EC-M-52/DEC.2, dated 27 July 2016). In operative paragraph 17 of that decision, the Council requested the Director-General to report to the Council on a monthly basis on the implementation of the decision. This twelfth monthly report covers the period from 23 July to 22 August 2017.

Progress in the elimination of Libyan chemical weapons by the State Party hosting destruction activities

3. Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von chemischen Kampfstoffen und Rüstungsaltlasten mbH (GEKA mbH), the designated destruction facility at Munster, Germany, completed the destruction of the 2-chloroethanol and tributylamine on 17 December 2016 and 20 January 2017, respectively.

4. As previously reported (EC-85/DG.1, dated 23 March 2017), the destruction of phosphorous trichloride was suspended as a necessary precaution in order to prevent the refractory coating from severe damage. Destruction totals for phosphorous trichloride remain at 3.2 metric tonnes (MT), or 2.8%.

5. Using the incinerator in Incinerator Plant 1 ("Munster 1"), GEKA mbH began the destruction of thionyl chloride on 24 March 2017. GEKA mbH and the Host State have notified the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") that the required permits to alter the destruction technology from incineration to neutralisation were received and neutralisation of thionyl chloride began on 5 July 2017. As at 21 August 2017, 43.51 MT, or 43.1%, of the thionyl chloride had been destroyed.

6. Secretariat teams continue to inspect GEKA mbH every two months, with the last such inspection having been conducted from 26 to 28 June 2017. No issues were encountered with the destruction process.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to Libya

7. The Secretariat inspected the destruction operations at GEKA mbH and conducted a final engineering review of the neutralisation system during the aforementioned inspection. The Secretariat inspection team confirmed that all verification measures were in place for the forthcoming neutralisation process and

verified the ongoing destruction through on-site confirmation and review of video recordings.

8. The next inspection at GEKA mbH is scheduled to take place from 11 to 14 September 2017. The Secretariat will continue to assess the verification procedures for the neutralisation process and confirm the destruction since the last inspection.

9. GEKA mbH is closely monitoring the destruction of the Libyan Category 2 chemical weapons to ensure that destruction will be completed by the deadline established in operative paragraph 3 of Council decision EC-M-52/DEC.2.

10. As previously reported, the Secretariat was informed that during decanting operations at the Ruwagha storage facility, one container experienced an exothermic reaction, causing the material inside to polymerise. Owing to the levels of the Category 2 chemicals remaining in the container (approximately 5%), the viscous nature of the remnants, and the limited ability to recover any usable material, the Secretariat is in a position to affirm that the material no longer presents a proliferation threat.

11. The Secretariat concluded an agreement with the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS) to contract a Libyan firm to complete the destruction of the aforementioned container. Destruction of the contents of the remaining container began on 25 July and was completed on 7 August 2017. Analysis of the hydrolysed contents has been received by the Secretariat, confirming destruction.

12. The Secretariat, in accordance with the report of the Council at its Eighty-Third Session (paragraph 6.12 of EC-83/5, dated 11 November 2016), continues to consult with the United Nations Office of Safety and Security (UNDSS) as to the possibility of Secretariat personnel travelling to Ruwagha to obtain soil samples. The UNDSS is currently advising against such travel. The Secretariat will continue to monitor the situation.

Overall costs and status of the trust fund

13. On 1 August 2016, the Secretariat issued a Note calling for voluntary contributions to the trust fund for support to Libya (S/1400/2016, dated 1 August 2016). As at the cut-off date of this report, the trust fund had received over EUR 1.2 million, with contributions having been received from Canada, Cyprus, Finland, New Zealand, and the United States of America. An additional EUR 133,638 was received from Canada in the form of a transfer of funds from a previous trust fund dedicated to Libya. Furthermore, the Secretariat received a contribution of EUR 20,000 from Spain on 30 June 2017. As at the cut-off date of this report, expenses in the amount of EUR 785,782 had been charged to the trust fund for activities related to the destruction of Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons.

14. The trust fund continues to be used to fund activities related to Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons. The OPCW has concluded an agreement with UNOPS, utilising funding from Cyprus, Finland, New Zealand, and Spain for the destruction of the remaining tank at Ruwagha.

15. The Secretariat has received a programme of work and budget for the clean-up operations of the Ruwagha Tank Farm. The programme of work and budget has been presented to potential donors for their consideration. The Secretariat acknowledges the request by the Council at its Eighty-Third Session to obtain soil samples from the area surrounding decanted Category 2 chemical tanks (paragraph 6.12 of EC-83/5). No action will be taken until sufficient soil samples can be obtained.

16. The Director-General would once again like to express his appreciation to those States Parties that have already made or have committed to making voluntary contributions to the trust fund.

United Nations S/2017/766

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 September 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 22 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, during its presidency of the Security Council in September 2017, Ethiopia will organize a high-level open debate on the theme "Reform of United Nations peacekeeping: implementation and follow-up", on 20 September 2017 at 10 a.m.

In order to help guide the debate, Ethiopia has prepared the attached concept note. I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Tekeda **Alemu**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-15937 (E) 150917

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Annex to the letter dated 22 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note for the high-level open debate on the theme "Reform of United Nations peacekeeping: implementation and follow-up", to be held on 20 September 2017

I. Introduction

United Nations peacekeeping has been an indispensable tool in the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security for much of the past seven decades. In the light of the changing global security environment, the need to reform United Nations peacekeeping so it can evolve and adapt to new realities has long been recognized. In this regard, discussions on reforming United Nations peacekeeping have gathered momentum over the past two years, on the basis of the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (S/2015/446) and the report of the Secretary-General entitled "The future of peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations" (S/2015/682).

The aim of the high-level open debate is to provide an opportunity for frank discussion on the reform of United Nations peacekeeping and to push forward the implementation and follow-up of peacekeeping reforms that form an important basis for strengthening United Nations peacekeeping, in order to make it fit for purpose in the twenty-first century.

II. Context

The high-level debate will be held two years after the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping and one year after the United Nations Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial: London 2016, at which substantial pledges were made by Member States to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping, at a time when the demand for its involvement in supporting peace and security and in protecting the most vulnerable has become greater than ever. Today, more than 100,000 peacekeepers are deployed in various parts of the world, with the mandate to protect civilians. The commitments made at the Leaders' Summit were meant to help the United Nations to meet persistent capacity gaps, improve the performance and capabilities of uniformed personnel, support rapid deployment and reinforce and enhance the foundation for future peacekeeping efforts.

However, participants at the Leaders' Summit and the London Ministerial also recognized that those commitments must be accompanied by the reform of United Nations peacekeeping, as set out in the London communiqué (S/2016/872, annex). That is why they welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on the future of peace operations. In his report, prepared on the basis of the Panel's report and also submitted in 2015, the former Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, made important recommendations on reforming and strengthening United Nations peace operations through an effective political strategy, improved design and implementation of mandates and enhanced partnerships, so as to make them much more effective, agile and responsive to current realities.

The former Secretary-General briefed the Security Council on his report and his recommendations on 20 November 2015, highlighting the important role that the Council could play in strengthening United Nations peace operations. Accordingly,

the Council, in a presidential statement adopted on 25 November 2015 (S/PRST/2015/22), welcomed the Secretary-General's efforts to advance the cause of reform as well as his initiative to undertake a comprehensive review of United Nations peace operations in an effort to consider measures to further strengthen the role, capacity, effectiveness, accountability and efficiency of the United Nations system, including its peace operations. The Security Council took note of the recommendations in his report and those in the report of the Panel, including the recommendations with respect to the strategic partnership with the African Union. In that regard, the Security Council expressed its intention to continue to consider the relevant recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General. There is now a need for a serious and meaningful discussion at the Security Council, with a view to advancing the implementation and follow-up of the report of the Secretary-General and his recommendations.

In the meantime, there are new developments that give added impetus to reform United Nations peace operations. The current Secretary-General, António Guterres, is committed to continuing the reform agenda of his predecessor from day one and has already embarked upon the steps needed to reform the overall United Nations peace and security architecture, including peace operations, in accordance with the recommendations of the review. Many of those reforms will need the full support of Member States, in particular, the members of the Security Council. The high-level debate should, therefore, be seen as an opportunity to convey a strong message of support to the Secretary-General and his reform agenda.

There are also increasing calls for ensuring greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the financing of United Nations peace operations. Although there seems to be a broad understanding of the need to address the issue as much as possible, there are divergent views, not only within the Security Council but also within the wider membership of the United Nations, on how that can be achieved without undermining the efficacy of peacekeeping as a necessary tool for global peace and security. This challenge has manifested itself in the difficult discussions that have recently taken place in both the Council and the Fifth Committee. As a result, there is a need for frank discussion in order to build, within the Council, the consensus needed to achieve the desired objective. The high-level debate is expected to provide that platform.

Another important issue for discussion has been the financing of African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council. Strengthening partnerships with regional and subregional organizations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations has already been recognized as imperative to ensuring a timely and effective response to crisis situations. In this regard, the African Union and its regional mechanisms have demonstrated the ability and flexibility to respond to challenging security situations, but they need predictable and sustainable financing and support.

The Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, signed by the leadership of the two organizations in April 2017, is a welcome development that will be instrumental in addressing the challenges of peace and security across the full spectrum of the conflict cycle. The report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to resolution 2320 (2016) provides a good basis for the Security Council to give further consideration to the support provided to African Union-led peace support operations (see S/2017/454). There is undoubtedly a divergence of views on the issue within the Council, which is not expected to be resolved any time soon. However, the high-level debate will provide an important occasion to hold frank discussion at the highest level on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General, in order to forge the necessary consensus on the issue.

III. Specific issues for discussion

To help guide the discussion, members could consider addressing the following questions during the high-level debate:

1. How has the reform of United Nations peacekeeping been implemented over the past two years, and what has been the impact on the performance of missions?

2. What can be done by the Security Council to enhance its role in ensuring implementation and follow-up?

3. How can the Security Council help the Secretary-General in his efforts to reform the United Nations peace and security architecture?

4. What is the status of commitments made by Member States in terms of force generation and the deployment of critical capabilities for United Nations peacekeeping, and what major gaps remain?

5. What can the Security Council do to support the new strategic partnership between the United Nations and the African Union?

6. Which options proposed by the Secretary-General are acceptable and feasible in providing the support necessary for African Union-led peace support operations?

IV. Briefers

The following briefers will be invited to make presentations on the theme of the discussion:

The Secretary-General;

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat;

A representative from the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.

V. Outcome

Ethiopia intends to introduce a draft resolution, to be negotiated by members of the Council and adopted at the high-level debate.

United Nations S/2017/767

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 September 2017
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 8 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 6-8 September 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

17-16263 (E) 180917 190917

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Annex to the letter dated 8 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (6 September 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: two in Damascus, two in Dar'a and one in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported one violation in Damascus governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out two humanitarian operations: 125 backpacks weighing a total of 100 kilograms were donated to schoolchildren in Humayrah, Hama governorate; and 2.2 tons of food was delivered to the local population in Khirbat al-Hazraf, Aleppo governorate.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, 11 ceasefire agreements have been signed with Hamud al-Jum'ah, Khirbat al-Ziyad, Khirbat al-Abraz, Khirbat al-Qatatin, Taws, Mazra' Sirbaya, Mazra' al-Rasm, Saya, Muhandisin and Shaykh Ahmad in Aleppo governorate, and with Abbad in Idlib governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,233.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 229.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (7 September 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has not reported any incidents of gunfire.

The Turkish representative office has reported five violations in the following governorates: three in Damascus, one in Hama and one in Homs.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation, delivering stationery supplies and 50 backpacks to schoolchildren in Duma, Damascus governorate.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 2,233.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 229.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (8 September 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported eight incidents of gunfire: six in Aleppo governorate and two in Damascus governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported two violations in Damascus governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out two humanitarian operations: 275 backpacks were donated to schoolchildren in Mahrusah, Hama governorate, and in Irlik district in the eastern part of Aleppo city.

Two United Nations operations have been carried out: a total of 50 tons of food and medicine were delivered to Yarmouk in Damascus governorate and to Kafr Haya in Idlib governorate.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 29 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 55,415 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire regime agreements have been signed.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,233.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 229.

United Nations S/2017/768

Security Council

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Letter dated 11 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The United States Mission to the United Nations requests that the Conventional Arms Dual-Use Control List (see annex) be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nikki **Haley**
Ambassador

17-15773 (E) 120917

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 11 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Expansion proposal for conventional arms-related dual-use items, 8 September 2017

Special materials and related items

Systems, equipment and components

1. Seals, gaskets, sealants or fuel bladders, made from more than 50 per cent by weight of any of the Fluorinated polyimides or Fluorinated phosphazene elastomers.

2. Manufactures of non-"fusible" aromatic polyimides in film, sheet, tape or ribbon.

3. Protective and detection equipment and components, not specially designed for military use, as follows:

   a. Full face masks, filter canisters, protective suits, gloves and shoes, detection systems and decontamination equipment specially designed or modified for defence against any of the following:

      1. "Biological agents";

      2. 'Radioactive materials'; or

      3. Chemical warfare (CW) agents.

4. Equipment and devices, specially designed to initiate charges and devices containing "energetic materials", by electrical means, as follows:

   a. Explosive detonator firing sets designed to drive explosive detonators specified by 1.A.7.b.

   b. Electrically driven explosive detonators as follows:

      1. Exploding bridge (EB);

      2. Exploding bridge wire (EBW);

      3. Slapper; or

      4. Exploding foil initiators (EFI).

   Technical notes

   1. The word initiator or igniter is sometimes used in place of the word detonator.

   2. For the purpose of 1.A.5.b. the detonators of concern all utilise a small electrical conductor (bridge, bridge wire, or foil) that explosively vaporises when a fast, high-current electrical pulse is passed through it. In non-slapper types, the exploding conductor starts a chemical detonation in a contacting high explosive material such as PETN (pentaerythritoltetranitrate). In slapper detonators, the explosive vaporisation of the electrical conductor drives a flyer or slapper across a gap, and the impact of the slapper on an explosive starts a chemical detonation. The slapper in some designs is driven by magnetic force. The

term exploding foil detonator may refer to either an EB or a slapper-type detonator.

5. Charges, devices and components, as follows:

   a. 'Shaped charges';

   b. Linear shaped cutting;

   c. Detonating cord with explosive core; or

   d. Cutters, and other severing tools.

Test, inspection and production equipment

1. Equipment for the production or inspection of "composite" structures or laminates or "fibrous or filamentary materials" as follows, and specially designed components and accessories therefor:

   a. 'Tow-placement machines', specially designed for the manufacture of "composite" structures.

2. Equipment for producing metal alloys, metal alloy powder or alloyed material.

3. Tools, dies, moulds or fixtures, for "superplastic forming" or "diffusion bonding" titanium, aluminium or their alloys.

Materials

Technical note

Metals and alloys

Unless provision to the contrary is made, the words 'metals' and 'alloys' cover crude and semi-fabricated forms, as follows:

Crude forms

Anodes, balls, bars (including notched bars and wire bars), billets, blocks, blooms, briquettes, cakes, cathodes, crystals, cubes, dice, grains, granules, ingots, lumps, pellets, pigs, powder, rondelles, shot, slabs, slugs, sponge, sticks.

1. Materials specially designed for use as absorbers of electromagnetic waves, or intrinsically conductive polymers, as follows:

   a. Intrinsically conductive polymeric materials based on any of the following polymers:

      1. Polyaniline;

      2. Polypyrrole;

      3. Polythiophene;

      4. Poly phenylene-vinylene; or

      5. Poly thienylene-vinylene.

2. "Superconductive" "composite" conductors.

3. "Fibrous or filamentary materials" as follows:

   a. Organic "fibrous or filamentary materials", having all of the following:

      1. "Specific modulus" exceeding 12.7×10^6 m; and

2. "Specific tensile strength" exceeding 23.5×10^4 m;

Note 1.C.10.a. does not apply to polyethylene.

b. Carbon "fibrous or filamentary materials", having all of the following:

1. "Specific modulus" exceeding 14.65×10^6 m; and

2. "Specific tensile strength" exceeding 26.82×10^4 m;

c. Inorganic "fibrous or filamentary materials", having all of the following:

1. "Specific modulus" exceeding 2.54×10^6 m; and

2. Melting, softening, decomposition or sublimation point exceeding 1,922 K (1,649°C) in an inert environment.

Software

1. "Software" specially designed or modified for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment specified above.

2. "Software" for the "development" of material specified above.

3. "Software" specially designed or modified to enable non-listed equipment to perform the functions of any equipment specified above.

Technology

1. "Technology" for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment materials or software specified above.

Materials processing equipment

Systems, equipment and components

1. Anti-friction bearings and bearing systems, as follows, and components therefor:

   Note 2.A.1. does not apply to balls with tolerances specified by the manufacturer in accordance with ISO 3290 as grade 5 or worse.

   a. Ball bearings and solid roller bearings, having all tolerances specified by the manufacturer in accordance with ISO 492 Tolerance Class 4 (or national equivalents), or better, and having both 'rings' and 'rolling elements', made from monel or beryllium;

      Technical notes

      1. 'Ring' — annular part of a radial rolling bearing incorporating one or more raceways (ISO 5593:1997).

      2. 'Rolling element' — ball or roller which rolls between raceways (ISO 5593:1997).

   c. Active magnetic bearing systems.

Test, inspection and production equipment

1. Machine tools and any combination thereof, for removing (or cutting) metals, ceramics or "composites", which, according to the manufacturer's technical specification, can be equipped with electronic devices for "numerical control":

   a. Machine tools for grinding having any of the following:

      1. Three or more axes which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control"; or

      2. Five or more axes which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control".

   b. Machine tools for removing metals, ceramics or "composites", having all of the following:

      1. Removing material by means of any of the following:

         a. Water or other liquid jets, including those employing abrasive additives;

         b. Electron beam; or

         c. "Laser" beam; and

      2. At least two rotary axes that can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control".

2. Numerically controlled optical finishing machine tools equipped for selective material removal to produce non-spherical optical surfaces.

3. Hot "isostatic presses" having all of the following, and specially designed components and accessories therefor:

   a. A controlled thermal environment within the closed cavity.

4. Equipment specially designed for the deposition, processing and in-process control of inorganic overlays, coatings and surface modifications, as follows:

   a. Chemical vapour deposition (CVD) production equipment;

   b. Ion implantation production equipment having beam currents of 5 mA or more;

   c. Electron beam physical vapour deposition (EB-PVD) production equipment;

   d. Plasma spraying production equipment operating at reduced pressure controlled atmosphere;

   e. Sputter deposition production equipment;

   f. Cathodic arc deposition production equipment; or

   g. Ion plating production equipment.

5. Dimensional inspection or measuring systems, equipment and "electronic assemblies", as follows:

   a. Computer controlled or "numerically controlled" Coordinate Measuring Machines (CMM);

   b. Linear and angular displacement measuring instruments, as follows:

      1. 'Linear displacement' measuring instruments having any of the following:

         a. Non-contact type measuring systems;

         b. Linear Variable Differential Transformer (LVDT) systems;

         c. Measuring systems containing a "laser";

         d. "Electronic assemblies" specially designed to provide feedback capability in systems specified by 2.B.6.;

      2. Angular displacement measuring instruments.

      Note *b.2. does not apply to optical instruments, such as autocollimators, using collimated light (e.g., "laser" light) to detect angular displacement of a mirror.*

   c. Equipment for measuring surface roughness (including surface defects), by measuring optical scatter.

6. "Robots" having any of the following characteristics and specially designed controllers and "end-effectors" therefor:

   a. Capable in real time of full three-dimensional image processing or full three-dimensional 'scene analysis' to generate or modify "programs" or to generate or modify numerical program data;

      Technical note

      The 'scene analysis' limitation does not include approximation of the third dimension by viewing at a given angle, or limited grey scale interpretation for the perception of depth or texture for the approved tasks (2 1/2 D).

   b. Specially designed to comply with national safety standards applicable to potentially explosive munitions environments;

   c. Specially designed or rated as radiation-hardened; or

d. Specially designed to operate at altitudes exceeding 30,000 m.

7. Assemblies or units, specially designed for machine tools, or dimensional inspection or measuring systems and equipment, as follows:

a. Linear position feedback units;

b. Rotary position feedback units; or

c. "Compound rotary tables" and "tilting spindles", for use with machine tools.

8. Spin-forming machines and flow-forming machines, which, according to the manufacturer's technical specification, can be equipped with "numerical control" units or a computer control and having all of the following:

a. Three or more axes which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control".

Technical note

For the purpose of machines combining the function of spin-forming and flow-forming are regarded as flow-forming machines.

Software

1. "Software" specially designed or modified for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment specified above; or

2. "Software" specially designed or modified to allow non-listed equipment to function as equipment specified above.

Technology

1. "Technology" for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment or "software" specified above.

Electronics

Systems, equipment and components

1. Electronic items as follows:

a. General purpose integrated circuits, as follows:

Note 1 The status of wafers (finished or unfinished), in which the function has been determined, is to be evaluated against the parameters of 3.A.1.a.

Note 2 Integrated circuits include the following types:

- *"Monolithic integrated circuits";*
- *"Hybrid integrated circuits";*
- *"Multichip integrated circuits";*
- *"Film type integrated circuits", including silicon-on-sapphire integrated circuits;*
- *"Optical integrated circuits";*
- *"Three dimensional integrated circuits";*
- *"Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuits" ("MMICs").*

1. Integrated circuits designed or rated as radiation hardened.

2. "Microprocessor microcircuits", "microcomputer microcircuits", microcontroller microcircuits, storage integrated circuits manufactured from a compound semiconductor, analogue-to-digital converters, integrated circuits that contain analogue-to-digital converters and store or process the digitized data, digital-to-analogue converters, electro-optical or "optical integrated circuits" designed for "signal processing", field programmable logic devices, custom integrated circuits for which either the function is unknown or the status of the equipment in which the integrated circuit will be used is unknown, Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) processors, Electrical Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories (EEPROMs), flash memories, Static Random-Access Memories (SRAMs) or Magnetic Random Access Memories (MRAMs).

3. Electro-optical and "optical integrated circuits", designed for "signal processing".

4. Field programmable logic.

5. Neural network integrated circuits.

6. Custom integrated circuits for which the function is unknown, or the status of the equipment in which the integrated circuits will be used is unknown to the manufacturer.

7. Direct Digital Synthesizer (DDS) integrated.

b. Microwave or millimetre wave items, as follows:

1. a. Travelling-wave 'vacuum electronic devices', pulsed or continuous wave;

b. Crossed-field amplifier 'vacuum electronic devices';

c. Thermionic cathodes designed for 'vacuum electronic devices';

d. 'Vacuum electronic devices' with the capability to operate in a 'dual mode'.

Technical note

'Dual mode' means the 'vacuum electronic device' beam current can be intentionally changed between continuous-wave and pulsed mode operation by use of a grid and produces a peak pulse output power greater than the continuous-wave output power.

2. "Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit" ("MMIC") amplifiers;

3. Discrete microwave transistors;

4. Microwave solid state amplifiers and microwave assemblies/modules containing microwave solid state amplifiers;

5. Electronically or magnetically tunable band-pass or band-stop filters;

6. Converters and harmonic mixers;

7. Microwave power amplifiers containing 'vacuum electronic devices';

8. Microwave Power Modules (MPMs) consisting of, at least, a travelling-wave 'vacuum electronic device', a "Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit" ("MMIC") and an integrated electronic power conditioner;

9. Oscillators or oscillator assemblies;

10. "Frequency synthesizer" "electronic assemblies";

11. 'Transmit/receive modules', 'transmit/receive MMICs', 'transmit modules', and 'transmit MMICs';

c. Acoustic wave devices as follows and specially designed components therefor:

1. Surface acoustic wave and surface skimming (shallow bulk) acoustic;

2. Bulk (volume) acoustic wave;

3. Acoustic-optic "signal processing";

d. Electronic devices and circuits containing components, manufactured from "superconductive" materials,

e. High energy devices as follows:

1. 'Cells' as follows:

a. 'Primary cells' having an 'energy density' exceeding 550 Wh/kg at 20°C;

b. 'Secondary cells' having an 'energy density' exceeding 350 Wh/kg at 20°C;

Technical notes

1. For the purpose of high energy devices, 'energy density' (Wh/kg) is calculated from the nominal voltage

multiplied by the nominal capacity in ampere-hours (Ah) divided by the mass in kilograms. If the nominal capacity is not stated, energy density is calculated from the nominal voltage squared then multiplied by the discharge duration in hours divided by the discharge load in Ohms and the mass in kilograms.

2. For the purpose of high energy devices, a 'cell' is defined as an electrochemical device, which has positive and negative electrodes, an electrolyte, and is a source of electrical energy. It is the basic building block of a battery.

3. For the purpose of high energy devices, a 'primary cell' is a 'cell' that is not designed to be charged by any other source.

4. For the purpose of high energy devices, a 'secondary cell' is a 'cell' that is designed to be charged by an external electrical source.

Note High energy devices do not apply to batteries, including single-cell batteries.

2. High energy storage capacitors;

3. "Superconductive" electromagnets and solenoids, specially designed to be fully charged or discharged in less than one second:

Note Above item does not apply to "superconductive" electromagnets or solenoids specially designed for Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) medical equipment.

4. Solar cells, cell-interconnect-coverglass (CIC) assemblies, solar panels, and solar arrays, which are "space-qualified", having a minimum average efficiency exceeding 20 per cent at an operating temperature of 301 K (28°C) under simulated 'AM0' illumination with an irradiance of 1,367 Watts per square meter (W/m^2);

Technical note

'AM0', or 'Air Mass Zero', refers to the spectral irradiance of sun light in the earth's outer atmosphere when the distance between the earth and sun is one astronomical unit (AU).

f. Rotary input type absolute position encoders having an "accuracy" equal to or less (better) than 1.0 second of arc and specially designed encoder rings, discs or scales therefor;

g. Solid-state pulsed power switching thyristor devices and 'thyristor modules', using either electrically, optically, or electron radiation controlled switch methods;

h. Solid-state power semiconductor switches, diodes, or 'modules', having all of the following:

1. Rated for a maximum operating junction temperature greater than 488 K (215°C);

2. Repetitive peak off-state voltage (blocking voltage) exceeding 300 V; and

3. Continuous current greater than 1 A;

Note 1 Repetitive peak off-state voltage in the above item includes drain to source voltage, collector to emitter voltage, repetitive peak reverse voltage and peak repetitive off-state blocking voltage.

2. General purpose "electronic assemblies", modules and equipment, as follows:

   a. Recording equipment and oscilloscopes, as follows:

      1. Digital data recorders;

      2. Real-time oscilloscopes having a vertical root-mean-square (rms) noise voltage of less than 2 per cent of full-scale at the vertical scale setting that provides the lowest noise value for any input 3dB bandwidth of 60 GHz or greater per channel;

   b. "Signal analysers";

   c. Signal generators;

   d. Network analysers having any of the following:

   e. Microwave test receivers;

   f. Atomic frequency;

Test, inspection and production equipment

1. Equipment for the manufacturing of semiconductor devices or materials, as follows and specially designed components and accessories therefor:

   a. Equipment designed for ion implantation;

   b. Lithography and Imprint lithography equipment;

   c. 1. Equipment specially designed for mask using deflected focused electron beam, ion beam or "laser" beam;

      2. Equipment designed for device processing using direct writing methods;

   d. Masks and reticles, designed for integrated circuits;

2. Test equipment specially designed for testing finished or unfinished semiconductor and microwave devices.

Materials

1. Hetero-epitaxial materials consisting of a "substrate" having stacked epitaxially grown multiple layers.

2. Resist materials designed for semiconductor lithography and "substrates".

3. Organo-inorganic compounds:

   a. Organo-metallic compounds of aluminium, gallium or indium, having a purity (metal basis) better than 99.999 per cent;

   b. Organo-arsenic, organo-antimony and organo-phosphorus compounds, having a purity (inorganic element basis) better than 99.999 per cent.

4. Hydrides of phosphorus, arsenic or antimony, having a purity better than 99.999 per cent, even diluted in inert gases or hydrogen.

Note *Above item does not apply to hydrides containing 20 per cent molar or more of inert gases or hydrogen.*

5. Silicon carbide (SiC), gallium nitride (GaN), aluminium nitride (AlN) or aluminium gallium nitride (AlGaN) semiconductor "substrates", or ingots, boules, or other preforms of those materials, having resistivities greater than 10,000 ohm-cm at 20°C.

6. "Substrates" specified in #5 with at least one epitaxial layer of silicon carbide, gallium nitride, aluminium nitride or aluminium gallium nitride.

Software

1. "Software" specially designed for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment specified above.

2. "Software" specially designed or modified to allow non-listed equipment to function as equipment specified above.

Technology

1. "Technology" for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment or materials specified above.

Sensors and "lasers"

Optical sensors

1. Optical sensors or equipment and components therefor, as follows:

   a. Special support components for optical sensors, as follows:

      1. "Space-qualified" cryocoolers;

      2. Non-"space-qualified" cryocoolers having a cooling source temperature below 218 K (-55°C)

      3. Optical sensing fibres specially fabricated either compositionally or structurally, or modified by coating, to be acoustically, thermally, inertially, electromagnetically or nuclear radiation sensitive.

Cameras

1. Cameras, systems or equipment, and components therefor, as follows:

   a. Instrumentation cameras and specially designed components therefor, as follows:

      Note *Instrumentation cameras, specified above, with modular structures should be evaluated by their maximum capability, using plug-ins available according to the camera manufacturer's specifications.*

      1. High-speed cinema recording cameras using any film format from 8 mm to 16 mm inclusive, in which the film is continuously advanced throughout the recording period, and that are capable of recording at framing rates exceeding 13,150 frames/s;

         Note *Above item does not apply to cinema recording cameras designed for civil purposes.*

      2. Mechanical high speed cameras;

      3. Mechanical or electronic streak cameras;

      4. Electronic framing cameras;

      5. Electronic cameras having all of the following:

         a. An electronic shutter speed (gating capability) of less than 1 µs per full frame; and

         b. A read out time allowing a framing rate of more than 125 full frames per second;

      6. Plug-ins having all of the following characteristics:

         a. Specially designed for instrumentation cameras which have modular structures;

         b. Imaging cameras as follows:

            Note *Above item does not apply to television or video cameras, specially designed for television broadcasting.*

            1. Video cameras incorporating solid state sensors, following;

            2. Scanning cameras and scanning camera systems;

            3. Imaging cameras incorporating image intensifier tubes;

4. Imaging cameras incorporating "focal plane arrays".

Optics

1. Optical equipment and components, as follows:
   a. Optical mirrors (reflectors) as follows:
      1. "Deformable mirrors";
      2. Lightweight monolithic mirrors;
      3. Lightweight "composite" or foam mirror;
      4. Mirrors specially designed for beam steering mirror stages;
   b. Optical components made from zinc selenide (ZnSe) or zinc sulphide (ZnS);
   c. "Space-qualified" components for optical systems.

Lasers

1. "Lasers", components and optical equipment, as follows:
   a. Non-"tunable" continuous wave "(CW) lasers;"
   b. "Tunable" "lasers";
   c. Other Semiconductor "lasers";

   Note 1 Includes semiconductor "lasers" having optical output connectors (e.g. fibre optic pigtails).

   Note 2 The status of semiconductor "lasers" specially designed for other equipment is determined by the status of the other equipment.

      1. a. Individual single-transverse mode semiconductor "lasers";
         b. Individual, multiple-transverse mode semiconductor "lasers";
         c. Individual semiconductor "laser" 'bars';
         d. Semiconductor "laser" 'stacked arrays' (two-dimensional arrays);
      2. "Chemical lasers" as follows:
         a. Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) "lasers";
         b. Deuterium Fluoride (DF) "lasers";
         c. "Transfer lasers" as follows:
            1. Oxygen Iodine (O_2-I) "lasers";
            2. Deuterium Fluoride-Carbon dioxide (DF-CO_2) "lasers";
      3. 'Non-repetitive pulsed' Nd: glass "lasers" having any of the following:
         a. "Pulse duration" not exceeding 1 µs and output energy exceeding 50 J per pulse; or
         b. "Pulse duration" exceeding 1 µs and output energy exceeding 100 J per pulse;

d. Components as follows:

1. Mirrors cooled either by "active cooling" or by heat pipe cooling;

2. Optical mirrors or transmissive or partially transmissive optical or electro-optical components, other than fused tapered fibre combiners and Multi-Layer Dielectric gratings (MLDs), specially designed for use with specified "lasers";

3. Fibre "laser" components;

Magnetic and electric field sensors

Magnetometers

1. "Magnetometers", "magnetic gradiometers", "intrinsic magnetic gradiometers", underwater electric field sensors, "compensation systems" and specially designed components therefor.

Gravimeters

1. Gravity meters (gravimeters) and gravity gradiometers.

Radar

1. Radar systems, equipment and assemblies.

2. "Laser" radar or Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) equipment.

Test, inspection and production equipment

Optics

1. Optical equipment as follows:

a. Equipment for measuring absolute reflectance to an "accuracy" of equal to or better than 0.1 per cent of the reflectance value;

b. Equipment other than optical surface scattering measurement equipment, having an unobscured aperture of more than 10 cm, specially designed for the non-contact optical measurement of a non-planar optical surface figure (profile) to an "accuracy" of 2 nm or less (better) against the required profile.

Note: Above item does not apply to microscopes.

Gravimeters

1. Equipment to produce, align and calibrate land-based gravity meters.

Radar

1. Pulse radar cross-section measurement.

Materials

Optical sensors

1. Optical sensor materials as follows:

   a. Elemental tellurium (Te) of purity levels of 99.9995 per cent or more;

   b. Single crystals (including epitaxial wafers) of any of the following:

      1. Cadmium zinc telluride (CdZnTe);

      2. Cadmium telluride (CdTe) of any purity level; or

      3. Mercury cadmium telluride (HgCdTe) of any purity level.

Optics

1. Optical materials as follows:

   a. Zinc selenide (ZnSe) and zinc sulphide (ZnS) "substrate blanks";

   b. Electro-optic materials and non-linear optical materials, as follows:

      1. Potassium titanyl arsenate (KTA) (CAS 59400-80-5);

      2. Silver gallium selenide (AgGaSe2, also known as AGSE) (CAS 12002-67-4);

      3. Thallium arsenic selenide (Tl3AsSe3, also known as TAS) (CAS 16142-89-5);

      4. Zinc germanium phosphide (ZnGeP2, also known as ZGP, zinc germanium biphosphide or zinc germanium diphosphide); or

      5. Gallium selenide (GaSe) (CAS 12024-11-2).

   c. "Substrate blanks" of silicon carbide or beryllium beryllium (Be-Be) deposited materials;

   d. Glass, including fused silica, phosphate glass, fluorophosphate glass, zirconium fluoride (ZrF4) (CAS 7783-64-4) and hafnium fluoride (HfF4) (CAS 13709-52-9);

   e. Synthetically produced diamond material.

Lasers

1. "Laser" materials as follows:

   a. Synthetic crystalline "laser" host material; or

   b. Rare-earth-metal doped double-clad fibres.

Software

1. "Software" specially designed for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment specified above.

2. "Software" specially designed or modified to allow non-listed equipment to function as equipment specified above.

Technology

1. "Technology for the "development", "production or "use" of equipment, materials or software specified above.

Navigation and avionics

Systems, equipment and components

1. Accelerometers as follows and specially designed components therefor:

   a. Linear accelerometers having any of the following:

      1. Specified to function at linear acceleration levels having a "scale factor" "repeatability" of less (better) than 1,250 ppm over a period of one year; or

      2. Designed for use in inertial navigation or guidance systems;

   b. Angular or rotational accelerometers, specified to function at linear acceleration.

2. Gyros or angular rate sensors, having any of the following and specially designed components therefor:

   a. Specified to function at linear acceleration having the following:

      1. A "bias" "stability" of less (better) than 0.5 degree per hour, when measured in a 1 g environment over a period of one month, and with respect to a fixed calibration value.

3. 'Inertial measurement equipment or systems', having any of the following:

   Note 1 'Inertial measurement equipment or systems' incorporate accelerometers or gyroscopes to measure changes in velocity and orientation in order to determine or maintain heading or position without requiring an external reference once aligned. 'Inertial measurement equipment or systems' include:

   – Attitude and Heading Reference Systems (AHRSs);

   – Gyrocompasses;

   – Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs);

   – Inertial Navigation Systems (INSs);

   – Inertial Reference Systems (IRSs);

   – Inertial Reference Units (IRUs).

   a. Designed for "aircraft", land vehicles or vessels, providing position without the use of 'positional aiding references', and having any of the following "accuracies" subsequent to normal alignment:

      1. 0.8 nautical miles per hour (nm/hr) "Circular Error Probable" ("CEP") rate or less (better);

      2. 0.5 per cent distance travelled "CEP" or less (better); or

      3. Total drift of 1 nautical mile "CEP" or less (better) in a 24 hour period;

   b. Designed for "aircraft", land vehicles or vessels, with an embedded 'positional aiding reference' and providing position after loss of all 'positional aiding references' for a period of up to 4 minutes, having an "accuracy" of less (better) than 10 meters "CEP";

Technical note

Refers to systems in which 'inertial measurement equipment or systems' and other independent 'positional aiding references' are built into a single unit (i.e., embedded) in order to achieve improved performance.

c. Designed for "aircraft", land vehicles or vessels, providing heading or True North determination;

d. Providing acceleration measurements or angular rate measurements, in more than one dimension.

4. 'Star trackers' and components therefor.

Technical note

'Star trackers' are also referred to as stellar attitude sensors or gyro-astro compasses.

5. Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) receiving equipment having any of the following and specially designed components therefor.

6. Airborne altimeters operating at frequencies other than 4.2 to 4.4 GHz inclusive and having any of the following:

a. "Power management"; or

b. Using phase shift key modulation.

Test, inspection and production equipment

1. Test, calibration or alignment equipment, specially designed for equipment specified by the section above.

2. Equipment specially designed to characterize mirrors for ring "laser" gyros, or less (better).

3. Equipment specially designed for the "production" of equipment specified by above.

Note *Including:*

- *Gyro tuning test stations;*
- *Gyro dynamic balance stations;*
- *Gyro run-in/motor test stations;*
- *Gyro evacuation and fill stations;*
- *Centrifuge fixtures for gyro bearings;*
- *Accelerometer axis align stations;*
- *Fibre optic gyro coil winding machines.*

Software

1. "Software" specially designed or modified for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment specified above.

2. "Software" specially designed or modified to allow non-listed equipment to function as equipment specified above.

3. "Source code" for the operation or maintenance of equipment specified above.

4. Computer-Aided-Design (CAD) "software" specially designed for the "development" of "active flight control systems", helicopter multi-axis fly-by-wire or fly-by-light controllers or helicopter "circulation controlled anti-torque or circulation-controlled direction control systems".

Technology

1. "Technology" for the "development", "production" and "use" of equipment or "software", specified above.

Marine

Systems, equipment and components

1. Marine systems, equipment and components, as follows:

   a. Systems, equipment and components, specially designed or modified for submersible vehicles and designed to operate at depths exceeding 1,000 m, as follows:

      1. Pressure housings or pressure hulls with a maximum inside chamber diameter exceeding 1.5 m;

      2. Direct current propulsion motors or thrusters;

      3. Umbilical cables, and connectors therefor, using optical fibre and having synthetic strength members;

      4. Components manufactured from material;

         Technical note

         The objective of the above item should not be defeated by the export of 'syntactic foam' designed for underwater use and having all of the following: a. Designed for marine depths exceeding 1,000 m and a density less than 561 kg/m^3 when an intermediate stage of manufacture has been performed and it is not yet in its final component form.

   b. Systems specially designed or modified for the automated control of the motion of submersible vehicles specified above, using navigation data, having closed loop servo-controls and having any of the following:

      1. Enabling a vehicle to move within 10 m of a predetermined point in the water column;

      2. Maintaining the position of the vehicle within 10 m of a predetermined point in the water column; or

      3. Maintaining the position of the vehicle within 10 m while following a cable on or under the seabed;

   c. Fibre optic pressure hull penetrators;

   d. "Robots" specially designed for underwater use, controlled by using a dedicated computer and having any of the following:

      1. Systems that control the "robot" using information from sensors which measure force or torque applied to an external object, distance to an external object, or tactile sense between the "robot" and an external object; or

      2. The ability to exert a force of 250 N or more or a torque of 250 Nm or more and using titanium based alloys or "composite" "fibrous or filamentary materials" in their structural members;

   e. 1. Stirling cycle engine air independent power systems having all of the following:

         a. Devices or enclosures, specially designed for underwater noise reduction in frequencies below 10 kHz, or special mounting devices for shock mitigation; and

b. Specially designed exhaust systems which discharge the products of combustion against a pressure of 100 kPa or more;

f. 1. Noise reduction systems designed for use on vessels of 1,000 tonnes displacement or more, as follows:

a. Systems that attenuate underwater noise at frequencies below 500 Hz and consist of compound acoustic mounts for the acoustic isolation of diesel engines, diesel generator sets, gas turbines, gas turbine generator sets, propulsion motors or propulsion reduction gears, specially designed for sound or vibration isolation and having an intermediate mass exceeding 30% of the equipment to be mounted;

b. 'Active noise reduction or cancellation systems' or magnetic bearings, specially designed for power transmission systems;

Technical note

'Active noise reduction or cancellation systems' incorporate electronic control systems capable of actively reducing equipment vibration by the generation of anti-noise or anti-vibration signals directly to the source.

Aerospace and propulsion

System, equipment and components

1. Aero gas turbine engines.

   Note 1 This item does not apply to aero gas turbine engines which meet all of the following:

   a. Certified by civil aviation authorities; and

   b. Intended to power non-military manned "aircraft" for which any of the following has been issued by civil aviation authorities for the "aircraft" with this specific engine type:

   1. A civil type certificate; or

   2. An equivalent document recognised by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).

   Note 2 This item does not apply to aero gas turbine engines designed for Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) approved by the civil aviation authority of the Member State.

2. 'Marine gas turbine engines'.

   Note The term 'marine gas turbine engines' includes those industrial, or aero-derivative, gas turbine engines adapted for a ship's electric power generation or propulsion.

3. Specially designed assemblies or components, for any of the following aero gas turbine engines:

   a. Specified above; or

   b. Whose design or production origins are either not unknown to the manufacturer.

4. Space launch vehicles, "spacecraft", "spacecraft buses", "spacecraft payloads", "spacecraft" on-board systems or equipment, and terrestrial equipment, as follows:

   a. Space launch vehicles;

   b. "Spacecraft";

   c. "Spacecraft buses";

   d. "Spacecraft payloads";

   e. On-board systems or equipment, specially designed for "spacecraft" and having any of the following functions:

      1. 'Command and telemetry data handling';

   f. Terrestrial equipment specially designed for "spacecraft", as follows:

      1. Telemetry and telecommand equipment;

      2. Simulators.

5. Liquid rocket propulsion systems.

6. Systems and components, specially designed for liquid rocket propulsion systems, as follows:

a. Cryogenic refrigerators, flightweight dewars, cryogenic heat pipes or cryogenic systems, specially designed for use in space vehicles;;

b. Cryogenic containers or closed-cycle refrigeration systems, for "aircraft", launch vehicles or "spacecraft";

c. Slush hydrogen storage or transfer systems;

d. High pressure (exceeding 17.5 MPa) turbo pumps, pump components or their associated gas generator or expander cycle turbine drive systems;

e. High-pressure (exceeding 10.6 MPa) thrust chambers and nozzles therefor;

f. Propellant storage systems using the principle of capillary containment or positive expulsion (i.e., with flexible bladders);

g. Liquid propellant injectors specially designed for liquid rocket engines;

h. One-piece carbon-carbon thrust chambers or one-piece carbon-carbon exit cones, with densities exceeding 1.4 g/cm^3 and tensile strengths exceeding 48 MPa.

7. Solid rocket propulsion systems and specially designed components.

8. Hybrid rocket propulsion systems.

9. Specially designed components, systems and structures, for launch vehicles, launch vehicle propulsion systems or "spacecraft", as follows:

10. a. Components and structures, specially designed for launch vehicle, manufactured using any of the following:

1. "Fibrous or filamentary materials;

2. Metal "matrix" "composite" materials; or

3. Ceramic "matrix" "composite" materials specified by 1.C.7.

11. "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles" ("UAVs"), unmanned "airships", related equipment and components.

Test, inspection and production equipment

1. On-line (real time) control systems, instrumentation (including sensors) or automated data acquisition and processing equipment and specially designed for the "development" of gas turbine engines, assemblies or components.

2. Equipment specially designed for the "production" or test of gas turbine brush seals.

3. Tools, dies or fixtures, for the solid state joining of "superalloy", titanium or intermetallic airfoil-to-disk combinations for gas turbines.

4. On-line (real time) control systems, instrumentation (including sensors) or automated data acquisition and processing equipment, specially designed for use in wind tunnels.

5. Acoustic vibration test equipment.

6. Equipment specially designed for inspecting the integrity of rocket motors and using Non-Destructive Test (NDT).

7. Direct measurement wall skin friction transducers.

8. Tooling specially designed for producing gas turbine engine powder metallurgy rotor components.

9. Equipment specially designed for the production of items specified by "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles" ("UAVs"), unmanned "airships and components.

Software

1. "Software" specially designed or modified for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment.

2. "Software" specially designed or modified to allow non-listed equipment to function as equipment specified above.

Technology

1. "Technology" for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment or software, specified above.

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Security Council

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The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), resolution 2270 (2016), resolution 2321 (2016), resolution 2356 (2017), resolution 2371 (2017) as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7), 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13), and 29 August 2017 (S/PRST/2017/16),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Expressing its gravest concern at the nuclear test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("the DPRK") on September 2, 2017 in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), and 2371 (2017) and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT") and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community and *expressing* great concern that the DPRK continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by diverting critically needed resources away from the people in the DPRK who have great unmet needs,

Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK's ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have destabilized the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

Underscoring its concern that developments on the Korean Peninsula could have dangerous, large-scale regional security implications,

Underscoring its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all States in accordance with the Charter, and *recalling* the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing also its desire for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the situation, and *reiterating* its welcoming of efforts by Council members as well as

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other Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue,

Underlining the need to ensure international peace and security, and ensure lasting stability in north-east Asia at large and to resolve the situation through peaceful, diplomatic and political means,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on September 2 of 2017 in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council's resolutions;

2. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall immediately suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on all missile launches; shall immediately abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon any other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

Designations

3. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individual and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and *decides* further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individual listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;

4. *Decides* to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) through the designation of additional WMD-related dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology, *directs* the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, and *further decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report, and *directs* the Committee to regularly update this list every twelve months;

5. *Decides* to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) through the designation of additional conventional arms-related items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology, *directs* the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, and *further decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report, and *directs* the Committee to regularly update this list every twelve months;

6. *Decides* to apply the measures imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 2371 (2016) on vessels transporting prohibited items from the DPRK, *directs* the Committee to designate these vessels and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, *further decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report, and *directs* the Committee to regularly update this list when it is informed of additional violations;

Maritime Interdiction of Cargo Vessels

7. *Calls upon* all Member States to inspect vessels with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

8. *Calls upon* all States to cooperate with inspections pursuant to paragraph 7 above, and, if the flag State does not consent to inspection on the high seas, *decides* that the flag State shall direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016), and *decides further* that, if a flag State neither consents to inspection on the high seas nor directs the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection, or if the vessel refuses to comply with flag State direction to permit inspection on the high seas or to proceed to such a port, then the Committee shall consider designating the vessel for the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 12 of resolution 2321 (2016) and the flag State shall immediately deregister that vessel provided that such designation has been made by the Committee;

9. *Requires* any Member State, when it does not receive the cooperation of a flag State of a vessel pursuant to paragraph 8 above, to submit promptly to the Committee a report containing relevant details regarding the incident, the vessel and the flag State, and *requests* the Committee to release on a regular basis information regarding these vessels and flag States involved;

10. *Affirms* that paragraph 7 contemplates only inspections carried out by warships and other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect, and *underscores* that it does not apply with respect to inspection of vessels entitled to sovereign immunity under international law;

11. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction, entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, and vessels flying their flag, from facilitating or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to or from DPRK-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK;

12. *Affirms* that paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 apply only with respect to the situation in the DPRK and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, with respect to any other situation and *underscores* in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law;

Sectoral

13. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all condensates and natural gas liquids, and *decides* that the DPRK shall not procure such materials;

14. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all refined petroleum products, *decides* that the DPRK shall not procure such products, *decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to procurement by the DPRK or the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of refined petroleum products in the amount of up to 500,000 barrels during an initial period of three months beginning on 1 October 2017 and ending on 31 December 2017, and refined petroleum products in the amount of up to 2,000,000 barrels per year during a period of twelve months beginning on 1 January 2018 and annually thereafter, provided that (a) the Member State notifies the Committee every thirty days of the amount of such supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK of refined petroleum products along with information about all the parties to the transaction, (b) the supply, sale, or transfer of refined petroleum products involve no individuals or entities that are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this resolution, including designated individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, directly or indirectly, or individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions, and (c) the supply, sale, or transfer of refined petroleum products are exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this resolution, *directs* the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75 per cent of the aggregate amount for the period between 1 October 2017 and 31 December 2017 has been reached, and again notify all Member States when 90 percent and 95 percent of such aggregate amount has been reached, *directs* the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached, also *directs* the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 90 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached, and *further directs* the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached and to inform them that they must immediately cease selling, supplying, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year, *directs* the Committee to make publicly available on its website the total amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK by month and by source country, *directs* the Committee to update this information on a real-time basis as it receives notifications from Member States, *calls upon* all Member States to regularly review this website to comply with the annual limits for refined petroleum products established by this provision, *directs* the Panel of Experts to closely monitor the implementation efforts of all Member States to provide assistance and ensure full and global compliance, and *requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect and provide additional resources in this regard,

15. *Decides* that all Member States shall not supply, sell, or transfer to the DPRK in any period of twelve months after the date of adoption of this resolution an amount of crude oil that is in excess of the amount that the Member State supplied, sold or transferred in the period of twelve months prior to adoption of this resolution, unless the Committee approves in advance on a case-by-case basis a shipment of crude oil is exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this resolution;

16. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products), and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance, and further *decides* that for such sales, supplies, and transfers of textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products) for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 135 days after the date of adoption of this resolution;

17. *Decides* that all Member States shall not provide work authorizations for DPRK nationals in their jurisdictions in connection with admission to their territories unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis in advance that employment of DPRK nationals in a member state's jurisdiction is required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, denuclearization or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), or this resolution, and *decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to work authorizations for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution;

Joint Ventures

18. *Decides* that States shall prohibit, by their nationals or in their territories, the opening, maintenance, and operation of all joint ventures or cooperative entities, new and existing, with DPRK entities or individuals, whether or not acting for or on behalf of the government of the DPRK, unless such joint ventures or cooperative entities, in particular those that are non-commercial, public utility infrastructure projects not generating profit, have been approved by the Committee in advance on a case-by-case basis, *further decides* that States shall close any such existing joint venture or cooperative entity within 120 days of the adoption of this resolution if such joint venture or cooperative entity has not been approved by the Committee on a case-by-case basis, and States shall close any such existing joint venture or cooperative entity within 120 days after the Committee has denied a request for approval, and *decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to existing China-DPRK hydroelectric power infrastructure projects and the Russia-DPRK Rajin-Khasan port and rail project solely to export Russia-origin coal as permitted by paragraph 8 of resolution 2371 (2017);

Sanctions Implementation

19. *Decides* that Member States shall report to the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the

Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, *requests* the Panel of Experts, in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;

20. *Calls upon* all Member States to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), and this resolution and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions;

21. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and *further decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2345 (2017), shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;

22. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), or this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Development of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972;

23. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

Political

24. *Reiterates* its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, *condemns* the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, and *emphasizes* the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK;

25. *Regrets* the DPRK's massive diversion of its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and a number of expensive ballistic missile programs, *notes* the findings of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance that well over half of the people in the DPRK suffer from major insecurities in food and medical care, including a very large number of pregnant and lactating women and under-five children who are at risk of malnutrition and nearly a quarter of its total population suffering from chronic

malnutrition, and, in this context, *expresses* deep concern at the grave hardship to which the people in the DPRK are subjected;

26. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK and *decides* that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions;

27. *Emphasizes* that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

28. *Reaffirms* its support for the Six Party Talks, *calls* for their resumption, and *reiterates* its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other's sovereignty and exist peacefully together, that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;

29. *Reiterates* the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, *expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic, and political solution to the situation, and *welcomes* efforts by the Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond;

30. *Urges* further work to reduce tensions so as to advance the prospects for a comprehensive settlement;

31. *Underscores* the imperative of achieving the goal of complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner;

32. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK's compliance, and, in this regard, *expresses its determination* to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch;

33. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

1. PAK YONG SIK

   a. *Description*: Pak Yong Sik is a member of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Military Commission, which is responsible for the development and implementation of the Workers' Party of Korea military policies, commands and controls the DPRK's military, and helps direct the country's military defense industries.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Identifiers*: YOB: 1950; Nationality: DPRK

Annex II

Asset Freeze (Entities)

1. CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE WORKERS' PARTY OF KOREA (CMC)

   a. *Description*: The Central Military Commission is responsible for the development and implementation of the Workers' Party of Korea's military policies, commands and controls the DPRK's military, and directs the country's military defense industries in coordination with the State Affairs Commission.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK

2. ORGANIZATION AND GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT (OGD)

   a. *Description*: The Organization and Guidance Department is a very powerful body of the Worker's Party of Korea. It directs key personnel appointments for the Workers' Party of Korea, the DPRK's military, and the DPRK's government administration. It also purports to control the political affairs of all of the DPRK and is instrumental in implementing the DPRK's censorship policies.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Location*: DPRK

3. PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION DEPARTMENT (PAD)

   a. *Description*: The Propaganda and Agitation Department has full control over the media, which it uses as a tool to control the public on behalf of the DPRK leadership. The Propaganda and Agitation Department also engages in or is responsible for censorship by the Government of the DPRK, including newspaper and broadcast censorship.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK

United Nations S/2017/770

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 September 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 11 September 2017 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as President of the Security Council, I am forwarding to you a letter dated 6 September 2017 from the Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, established by Security Council resolution 1612 (2005), based on the conclusions adopted by the Working Group on 22 June 2017 (S/AC.51/2017/3).

(*Signed*) Tekeda **Alemu**
President of the Security Council

17-15852 (E) 130917

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Annex

At its 63rd formal meeting, on 18 April 2017, the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict examined the fifth report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Sudan (S/2017/191), covering the period from 1 March 2011 to 31 December 2016. At its 66th meeting, on 22 June 2017, the Working Group adopted its conclusions on children and armed conflict in the Sudan (S/AC.51/2017/3).

In follow-up to the recommendations of the Working Group and subject to and consistent with applicable international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011), 2068 (2012), 2143 (2014) and 2255 (2015), I am entrusted, in my capacity as Chair of the Working Group, with:

(a) Requesting you to continue to ensure the effectiveness of the monitoring and reporting mechanism in the Sudan and of the child protection component of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, including by allocating sufficient dedicated child protection capacity to the component and to the United Nations Children's Fund to, inter alia, monitor and report on violations and abuses committed against children, mainstream child protection within the mission, train the mission personnel in child protection and engage in dialogue with parties to the armed conflict on action plans and their implementation;

(b) Requesting you to ensure that the country task force on monitoring and reporting continues its work and advocacy for the release and reintegration of children associated with armed groups and armed forces, to support the implementation of the action plans and commitments and to continue engagement with the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid to develop an action plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children, in line with Security Council resolutions 1539 (2004), 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011), 2068 (2012), 2143 (2014) and 2225 (2015).

(*Signed*) Olof **Skoog**
Chair
Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict

United Nations S/2017/771

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 September 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 11 September 2017 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as President of the Security Council, I am forwarding to you a letter dated 6 September 2017 from the Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, established by the Security Council in its resolution 1612 (2005), based on the Working Group's conclusions adopted on 3 August 2017 (S/AC.51/2017/4) (see annex).

(*Signed*) Tekeda **Alemu**
President of the Security Council

17-15854 (E) 140917

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Annex

Letter dated 6 September 2017 from the Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict addressed to the Secretary-General

At its 65th meeting, on 2 June 2017, the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict examined the fourth report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Philippines (S/2017/294), covering the period from 1 December 2012 to 31 December 2016. At its 67th meeting, on 3 August 2017, the Working Group adopted its conclusions on children and armed conflict in the Philippines (S/AC.51/2017/4).

In follow-up to the recommendations of the Working Group and subject to and consistent with applicable international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011), 2068 (2012), 2143 (2014) and 2255 (2015), I am entrusted, in my capacity as Chair of the Working Group, with:

(a) Inviting you to ensure that the United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting strengthens its monitoring and reporting activities regarding all violations and abuses committed against children in the armed conflict in the Philippines, including continuing to implement the principles of the action plan between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the United Nations in the Philippines signed on 1 August 2009;

(b) Requesting you to encourage the United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting to renew its efforts to reach out to non-State armed groups, with a view to developing action plans to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children in violation of applicable international law and to address other violations and abuses against children in armed conflict in the Philippines.

(*Signed*) Olof **Skoog**
Chair
Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict

United Nations S/2017/772

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 September 2017
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 8 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you of the following:

Early yesterday morning on Thursday, 7 September 2017, Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, and used that airspace to strike targets in the Syrian Arab Republic.

That Israeli act constitutes a blatant violation of Lebanese sovereignty and a breach of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant United Nations resolutions. It also represents a dangerous military escalation that threatens international stability, security and peace.

I ask you to condemn this act of Israeli aggression in the strongest possible terms, and to take all measures necessary to deter Israel from continuing its dangerous violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of my country.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-16014 (E) 140917 180917

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